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INTRODUCTION 
In a recent televised debate, four law professors partnered up to argue 
for, or against, the following proposition: “Courts, not campuses, should 
decide sexual assault cases.”
1
  Their staged debate reflected the heated 
discussion occurring in society more broadly over the most appropriate 
forum and method for addressing campus sexual assault.  As campus sexual 
assault has finally ascended to the status of a national concern, attracting the 
attention of even the White House, two main camps have emerged: those 
who believe campus sexual assault is a crime, and thus best dealt with in the 
criminal courts, using criminal law tools; and those who believe campus 
sexual assault is a civil rights violation, and thus best dealt with through 
university disciplinary proceedings, using Title IX.
2
 
The criminal law camp argues that because campus sexual assault is a 
crime, it falls under the domain of the police and the criminal courts.  
Further, they argue that universities lack the institutional competency to 
address sexual assault, since sexual assault is nothing like plagiarism or the 
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 1.  Courts, not Campuses, Should Decide Sexual Assault Cases, INTELLIGENCE2 DEBATES 
(Sept. 16, 2015), http://intelligencesquaredus.org/debates/past-debates/item/1402-courts-not-
campuses-should-decide-sexual-assault-cases. 
 2.  Compare Nancy Gertner, Sex, Lies and Justice: Can We Reconcile the Belated Attention to 
Rape on Campus with Due Process?, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, (Winter 2015), 
http://www.prospect.org/article/sex-lies-and-justice, and Wendy Kaminer, Victimizing the Accused? 
Obama’s Campus Sexual Assault Guidelines Raise Concerns, 90.9 WBUR COGNOSCENTI BLOG 
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harassment-policy/HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html, with Alexandra Brodsky, Fair 
Process, Not Criminal Process, is the Right Way to Address Campus Sexual Assault, THE AMERICAN 
PROSPECT (Jan. 21, 2015),  http://prospect.org/article/fair-process-not-criminal-process-right-way-
address-campus-sexual-assault, and Amy Chmielewski, Comment, Defending the Preponderance of 
the Evidence Standard in College Adjudications of Sexual Assault, 2013 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 143, 
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other kinds of wrongs which universities normally deal with under honor 
codes and disciplinary procedures.
3
  They warn of many anecdotal instances 
of what appear to be universities egregiously mishandling claims.
4
  In their 
view, universities generally function like kangaroo courts trampling the 
rights of students accused of sexual misconduct.
5
 
The Title IX camp, on the other hand, argues that because campus 
sexual assault is a civil rights violation, it falls under the domain of the 
university.
6
  They point out that just as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 guaranteed a right to equal opportunity in employment, “Title IX 
guarantees broad rights to an equal education.”
7
  As part of its equal 
education guarantee, Title IX prohibits sex discrimination and other forms of 
gender or sexually-based violence, and obligates universities receiving 
federal funds to maintain a non-discriminatory environment.
8
  Title IX 
advocates therefore argue that this civil rights system has little to do with the 
criminal law, and that the disciplinary systems within universities are best 
able to offer an adjudicative system that promotes these goals.
9
  They resist 
the attempted “criminalization” of Title IX, and argue that the criminal law 
offers neither an appropriate forum, nor the appropriate tools, with which to 
address campus sexual assault.
10
 
This Symposium essay argues that there is an important piece missing 
from the polarized criminal law versus Title IX conversation.  The narrow 
framing of Title IX versus the criminal law ignores a third possible 
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and Cautions, 125 YALE L. J. FORUM 281, 285–86 (2016).  
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rights cause of action for ‘crimes of violence motivated by gender.’”).   
 8.  Title IX declares that “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”  20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 
(2012).   
 9.  Cantalupo, supra note 6, at 284. 
 10.  Id. at 284–85. 
2016] BETWEEN TITLE IX AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 965 
 
characterization of campus sexual assault: it is also a tort.
11
  In addition to 
being a crime, and a civil rights violation, campus sexual assault is also a 
private, tortious wrong, and thus potentially subject to adjudication in civil 
court, using the usual rules of civil procedure.  Moreover, tort law offers 
more than just a third mode of adjudication potentially available to those 
who experience campus sexual assault; acknowledging that campus sexual 
assault is a tort, capable of redress in the private law system, also offers 
important conceptual insights for the campus sexual assault debate.  
Specifically, the reconceptualization of campus sexual assault as a tort can 
help resolve three contested issues where the Title IX approach and the 
criminal law approach dramatically clash. 
Part I of this Symposium piece explores why tort law has been left out 
of the campus sexual assault debate.  Much of the explanation lies in history.  
For hundreds of years, legal redress for sexual assault has shifted back and 
forth, oscillating between rape as a public, criminal wrong, and rape as a 
private, civil wrong.  Different eras have had different emphases.  However, 
for the last century, sexual assault has been understood as predominantly 
criminal.  In fact, this framing has become so powerful that it is often 
difficult to think of sexual assault as anything other than a crime.  Part I 
attempts to break this conceptual stranglehold by recounting how tort law is 
also an important, though often ignored, means of redressing sexual assault.  
As an additional non-criminal framing for the wrong of sexual assault, tort 
law thus supports the Title IX position that other non-criminal 
characterizations of and approaches to campus sexual assault can also be 
valid. 
Part II argues that incorporating tort law into the campus sexual assault 
conversation generates important insights that can assist in resolving three 
contentious issues in the campus sexual assault debate.
12
  The first issue 
concerns the extent to which law enforcement should have a hegemony on 
sexual violence adjudication.
13
  Tort law suggests that the current wave of 
legislation proposing that schools must “refer all reports of sexual 
violence . . . to law enforcement” is misguided,
14
 and reminds us of the 
importance of having complainant-driven processes in the sexual assault 
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F. Colb, “Yes Means Yes” and Preponderance of the Evidence, DORF ON LAW BLOG (Oct. 29, 2014, 
8:30 AM), www.dorfonlaw.org/2014/10/yes-means-yes-and-preponderance-of.html. 
 12.  See Cantalupo, supra note 6, at 285. 
 13.  Id.  
 14.  Id. 
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context.  Second, tort law may set the appropriate scope of procedural 
protections for campus sexual assault adjudications.  Although criminal law 
advocates have made a “concerted effort to import criminal due process 
requirements into campus disciplinary and grievance proceedings,”
15
 civil 
due process requirements are arguably a better touchstone, since the 
consequences of being held responsible for campus sexual assault in a Title 
IX proceeding are very similar to the consequences of a civil finding of 
liability for sexual assault, and very unlike the consequences of a criminal 
conviction.  Third, through an analysis of the consent element in tort claims 
for sexual assault, the newly instituted standard of affirmative consent 
becomes more defensible.  Ultimately, bringing tort law into the campus 
sexual assault debate opens up the vast and fertile ground between the two 
poles of criminal and Title IX, thereby helping to resolve existing points of 
contention and to clear the path towards better institutional design and a 
more effective solution to this social problem. 
II. THE EXCLUSION OF TORT LAW 
The debate between the criminal law approach and the Title IX 
approach often plays out in the media.  Voices calling for the criminal law 
approach to campus sexual assault are heard in op-ed articles like Why 
Colleges Should Report Sex Crimes, Pronto, to Police and Prosecutors;
16
 
Colleges are Not Equipped to Investigate Sexual Assault;
17
 Law 
Enforcement Must Take the Lead in Campus Sexual Assault Cases,
18
 and 
Time to Call the Cops: Title IX has Failed Campus Sexual Assault.
19
  Title 
IX advocates, on the other hand, try to persuade the public that colleges can 
effectively and justly adjudicate these claims, through articles like The 
Promise of Title IX: Sexual Violence and the Law;
20
 No, We Can’t Just 
                                                          
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Editorial Board, Why Colleges Should Report Sex Crimes, Pronto, to Police and 
Prosecutors, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 28, 2015, 11:49 AM), 
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Leave College Sexual Assault to the Police;
21




Both sides argue that the other lacks the institutional competency to 
adequately address campus sexual assault.  Criminal law advocates point to 
numerous examples of apparently botched Title IX investigations, and 
emphasize a perceived lack of expertise on the part of the college 
community members involved with sexual assault adjudication.
23
  For their 
part, Title IX advocates also use institutional competency arguments, and 
point to the fact that the criminal law has a woeful track record of addressing 
sexual assault.
24
  Even rape reforms like rape shield laws have done little to 
actually change rape reporting or conviction rates.  A growing scholarly 
consensus supports the position that the criminal law may simply be 
structurally unable to adequately address sexual assault,
25
 and Title IX 
advocates therefore argue that Title IX’s civil rights approach has a much 
greater chance of successfully addressing this social problem. 
Neither side uses tort law as a basis for argumentation.  Given that the 
“tortification” of federal civil rights law is a fairly well recognized 
phenomenon,
26
 it is perhaps surprising that tort law has not been a larger part 
of the campus sexual assault conversation. There is a deep “connection 
between civil rights and civil wrongs,” and courts frequently explicitly rely 
on tort law when interpreting civil rights and anti-discrimination law, and 
have asserted not only that they may do so, but that they should do so.
27
  
                                                          
Law, DISSENT MAG. (Fall 2015), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/title-ix-activism-sexual-
violence-law. 
 21.  Alexandra Brodsky & Elizabeth Deutsch, No, We Can’t Just Leave College Sexual Assault 
to the Police, POLITICO MAG. (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/12/uva-
sexual-assault-campus-113294. 
 22.  Holly Rider-Milkovich, Campuses are the Best Place for Accountability, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/08/12/doing-enough-to-prevent-rape-on-
campus/campuses-are-the-best-places-for-sexual-assault-accountability. 
 23.  Christina Hoff Sommers, In Making Campuses Safe for Women, a Travesty of Justice for 
Men, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (June 5, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/In-Making-Campuses-
Safe-for/127766/.  Many also argue that campus sexual assault investigations and adjudications may 
have a racialized component.  See Jeannie Suk, Shutting Down Conversations About Rape at 
Harvard Law, NEW YORKER (Dec. 11, 2015) www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/argument-
sexual-assault-race-harvard-law-school. 
 24.  Sarah L. Swan, Triangulating Rape, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 403, 407 (2013). 
 25.  See, e.g., Deborah Tuerkheimer, Rape On and Off Campus, 65 EMORY L.J. 1, 2 (2015); 
Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 585 (2009); Samuel 
W. Buell, Culpability and Modern Crime, 103 GEO. L.J. 547, 551 (2015).   
 26.  See Sandra F. Sperino, Let’s Pretend Discrimination is a Tort, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1107, 1109 
(2014); Martha Chamallas & Sandra F. Sperino, Torts and Civil Rights Law: Migration and 
Conflict: Symposium Introduction, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1021, 1021 (2014). 
 27.  Chamallas & Sperino, supra note 26, at 1021. 
968 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that in creating the “federal tort” 
contained in Title VII, Congress “adopt[ed] the background of general tort 
law.”
28




There has also been a tortification of criminal law.  Although tort and 
crime are distinct legal regimes, recently “the tort/crime line” has blurred.
30
  
So-called crimtorts (torts that remedy public harms and arguably serve a 
public purpose) are one example of this blurring,
31
 as is the infiltration of 
tort concepts into areas like regulatory and traffic crimes.
32
  Indeed, the 
criminal law regarding sexual assault may soon undergo its own 
tortification, if the currently proposed American Legal Institution draft on 
sexual assault is accepted.  It imports a “tort negligence standard for criminal 
liability” for sexual assault in some circumstances.
33
 
Despite its increasing presence in criminal and antidiscrimination law, 
tort has been largely absent from the campus sexual assault conversation.  
There is a simple, two-part explanation for this.  First, few students have 
actually used tort law as a means of addressing campus sexual assault.
34
  
Although it is an available avenue of relief, individuals who experience 
campus sexual assault do not often access the civil courts and bring tort 
claims. 
The second part of the explanation relates to why this is so: for most of 
recent modern history, the idea that rape is a crime and thus best dealt with 
within the confines of the criminal law has been dominant.  Rape is most 
                                                          
 28.  Id. (quoting Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 417 (2011)). 
 29.  Id. (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013)).  In 
general, tort law has been seen as weakening civil rights law.  See Anthony Sebok, What Happens if 
We Call Discrimination a Tort?, JOTWELL (Dec. 17, 2015), http://torts.jotwell.com/what-happens-if-
we-call-discrimination-a-tort/.  
 30.  Noah M. Kazis, Comment, Tort Concepts in Traffic Crimes, 125 YALE L. J. 1131, 1134 
(2016). 
 31.  See Thomas H. Koenig, Crimtorts: A Cure for Hardening of the Categories, 17 WIDENER 
L. J. 733, 737–38 (2008). 
 32.  Kazis, supra note 30, at 1133–34. 
 33.  Greg Piper, Attempt to Quietly Redefine Sexual Assault in U.S. Law Draws Backlash from 
Lawyers, THECOLLEGEFIX.COM (Jan. 26, 2016) www.thecollegefix.com/post/25983 (quoting 
Professor Kevin Cole).  Aya Gruber argues that tort law has already seeped into criminal rape trials.  
She describes how contributory negligence and assumption of risk defenses have been imported into 
criminal law, to the detriment of rape victims.  Aya Gruber, Pink Elephants in the Rape Trial: The 
Problem of Tort-Type Defenses in the Criminal Law of Rape, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 203, 
211 (1997). 
 34.  Ellen Bublick, Tort Suits Filed by Rape and Sexual Assault Victims in Civil Courts: 
Lessons for Courts, Classrooms and Constituencies, 59 S.M.U. L. REV. 55, 75–84 (2006) (noting 
that tort cases that are brought often focus on the school’s role in the assault). 
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often thought of as a quintessential criminal wrong, as a violent crime that 
deviant, pathological strangers-in-bushes perpetuate, and thus one that is 
rightly punished through the full punitive weight of the state.
35
 
However, it was not always thus.  Historically, rape has “often blurred 
the line between a public and private offense, and different periods and 
regimes emphasized each of these aspects.”
36
  Ancient Greek and Roman 
law, for instance, emphasized rape as a private wrong.
37
  Conversely, in the 
fourth and fifth century, rape was predominantly addressed as a public 
wrong.
38
  These switches in emphasis reveal that, essentially, “[t]he 
conception of rape as being fundamentally a public wrong, or fundamentally 




Because rape originally protected a patriarchal interest, and was initially 
understood as a “violation of an authoritative male’s property right [in a 
woman]” rather than a “personal harm to the woman herself,” for centuries 
only fathers, husbands, and masters could bring civil actions for rape.
40
  
Finally, in the mid-nineteenth century, women became able to assert their 
own sexual battery claims, but only through the cause of action of seduction, 
a wrong which was also both private and public, both a tort and a crime.
41
  It 
was not until the early twentieth century that some state laws began 
recognizing civil liability for rape in a more direct way, but they did so in 
the face of an already strongly-entrenched notion that rape was a public 
wrong.  Several states had criminal law doctrines “‘designed to discourage 
private recovery for what many considered a public wrong,’ and in many 
jurisdictions there was a ‘general cultural reluctance to transform so serious 
a public wrong into a claim for monetary damages.’”
42
 
Because of these cultural views, “[t]he explicit recognition of rape as a 
basis for civil liability did not immediately give rise to much civil litigation 
in this area.”
43
  The number of claims began rising in the 1970s, but relative 
to the occurrences of sexual assault, it is still quite small.
44
  Nevertheless, 
civil claims for sexual assault is a growing area of litigation, and an 
                                                          
 35.  Swan, supra note 24, at 422–23. 
 36.  Id. at 411. 
     37.    JAMES BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL Europe 14 (1987).  
     38.    Id. at 98.  
 39.  Swan, supra note 24, at 411. 
 40.  Id. at 409–10. 
 41.  Id. at 414. 
 42.  Lea VanderVelde, The Legal Ways of Seduction, 48 STAN. L. REV. 817, 824 (1995)). 
 43.  Swan, supra note 24, at 415. 
 44.  Tom Lininger, Is it Wrong to Sue for Rape?, 57 DUKE L.J. 1557, 1568 (2008).  
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increasing number of litigants are using the civil courts as either an 
alternative or a complement to the criminal process.
45
 
On college campuses, though, many complainants who want to access a 
formalized system of redress turn to their school’s Title IX procedure, rather 
than to the civil courts.
46
  In its ideal form, Title IX offers an easy-to-access 
and easy-to-navigate in-house process that can, through a variety of 
mechanisms, help minimize the impact of sexual violence on one’s 
education.
47
  In addition to Title IX, some students also at least consider the 
possibility of a criminal process, but many forego it because it is widely 
understood to be hostile to sexual assault complainants.  A civil claim, on 
the other hand, is rarely even considered as an option, or, if it is brought to 
mind, is thought to require an attorney to access and navigate.
48
 
Were students to more readily access the tort system, they would find 
that, while by no means perfect, it can be a viable and helpful form of 
redress for many complainants.
49
  The dominant mode of rape redress, 
however, remains the criminal court, and it is the criminal court that looms 
largest in the public imagination as the forum in which rape adjudication 
occurs.  “[T]he vast majority of the law’s involvement with sexual assault 
and rape takes place within the context of the criminal law system[,]” not the 
civil one, and the discussion surrounding campus sexual assault has also 
mirrored the dominance of the criminal law as a form of redress.
50
  The slow 
historical development of sexual assault as a civil wrong, and the hegemonic 
dominance of the criminal law as the primary mode of its redress, has 
                                                          
 45.  Swan, supra note 24, at 424. 
 46.  To be clear, the categories of victim and perpetrator are gendered: in one study of claims 
made to an educational insurer in a two year period between 2011 and 2013, ninety-nine percent of 
the perpetrators of sexual assault were male, and ninety-four percent of the victims were women.  
UNITED EDUCATORS INSURANCE, CONFRONTING CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT: AN EXAMINATION OF 
HIGHER EDUCATION CLAIMS 3 (2015), https://www.bgsu.edu/content/dam/BGSU/human-
resources/documents/training/lawroom/Sexual_assault_claim_study.pdf. 
 47.  Cantalupo, supra note 6, at 284. 
 48.  Examples of civil cases involving campus sexual assault include Weldon v. Rivera, 301 
A.D.2d 934 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (female student raped in dorm room sued rapist and other male 
who watched the assault) and Nero v. Kan. State Univ., 861 P.2d 768 (Kan. 1993) (female student 
sexually assaulted by another student in her residence hall brought an action alleging negligence 
against the university and a separate action against the perpetrator). 
 49.  Problems include access to justice issues, comparative fault rules, and the persistence of 
rape myths.  See, e.g., Ellen M. Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules: Rape Victims and Comparative 
Fault, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1427–41 (1999); Bublick, supra note 34, at 75–84; Swan, supra 
note 24, at 443–53.  A prepetrator’s physical presence may also be difficult for a complainant.  See 
Tyler Kingdale, College Rape Case Highlights Emotional Toll for Victims Who Sue, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Aug. 31, 2015, 1:12 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/virginia-wesleyan-rape-
lawsuit_us_55ddf19be4b08cd3359e36c7.   
 50.  Swan, supra note 24, at 416. 
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eclipsed the role of sexual assault as a tort, and campus sexual assault as a 
civil wrong has not yet been incorporated into the campus sexual assault 
debate in any meaningful way. 
Title IX suffers from a similar new-kid-on-the-block syndrome, and has 
had difficulty establishing itself as a legitimate avenue of redress.  However, 
when conceptually paired with tort law, these two non-criminal alternatives 
may help legitimate each other.  Together, they reinforce the idea that there 
are multiple ways to approach and frame wrongs, even wrongs typically 
thought of as criminal. 
III. CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT AS A TORTIOUS WRONG 
 Once we start thinking of campus sexual assault as a wrong that is not 
only criminal, and not only a civil rights violation, but also a tort, three 
insights emerge that shed light on the most contentious areas of the Title IX 
versus criminal law debate.  First, the tort law conceptualization helps 
explain why calls to refer all campus sexual assault claims to criminal law 
enforcement are misguided.  Second, tort law sets a useful standard for the 
procedural protections that should apply when adjudicating claims of sexual 
assault, both through the procedural protections normally applicable to tort 
claims, and through the tort cases in which students have challenged poor 
procedure.  Third, analyzing the consent element in a battery action (the 
most popular tort cause of action for sexual assault claims) helps explain 
why affirmative consent is an appropriate standard. 
A. Forwarding Claims to Criminal Law Enforcement 
By leaving tort law out of the debate, the criminal law versus Title IX 
debate suggests that there are only two possible ways to address campus 
sexual assault: the criminal law, or Title IX.  As a first-best option, criminal 
law advocates argue that because sexual assault is a crime, campus sexual 
assault should remain the province of criminal authorities, and universities 
should simply refer cases directly to law enforcement.  To that end, many 
legislators are currently proposing bills that would require universities to 
forward all claims of campus sexual assault to criminal law enforcement.
51
  
Such legislation would essentially transform a school-based complaint into a 
criminal complaint, thereby “turning a victim’s report to school authorities 
                                                          
 51.  Cantalupo, supra note 6, at 291.  
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into an indirect report to law enforcement.”
52
 
Tort law supports the Title IX advocates’ view that such legislation is 
misguided, and offers an extensive literature on the importance of 
complainant-driven processes.
53
  Through enabling a person who has been 
harmed to either bring a claim or not, at his or her discretion, tort law is 
understood as empowering victims.
54
  Pursuing a legal action, when one 
chooses to do so, asserts one’s inherent dignity.
55
  Dignity is (at least partly) 
a status-concept: “it has to do with the standing (perhaps the formal legal 
standing or perhaps, more informally, the moral presence) that a person has 
in a society and in her dealings with others.”
56
  A complainant-driven legal 
process tells society that the complainant has the full “status of a person” 
and can “demand that her agency and her presence among us as human 
beings be taken seriously and accommodated in the lives of others.”
57
 
Conversely, forcing an unwanted legal process onto a person is deeply 
problematic.  In ignoring a harmed women’s desire to engage or not engage 
a legal process, the legislation proposing mandatory criminal reporting 
repeats a problem of the criminal law itself: it does not honor the wishes of 
the person actually harmed.
58
  In criminal law, a victim’s “consent or 
willingness to engage the [legal] process ‘is neither necessary nor sufficient 
for a prosecution to be brought.’”
59
  A victim’s willingness to engage in the 
criminal process is not sufficient to compel prosecution; even when victims 
desperately want claims pursued, prosecutors frequently choose to 
nevertheless abandon charges.  And a victim who adopts the contrary 
position, and prefers not to invoke the criminal process, may find that her 
consent or willingness to pursue a criminal complaint is unnecessary; her 
unwillingness is not enough to deter prosecution.
60
  The criminal process 
may proceed without her agreement, as the Sixth Circuit of the United States 
Court of Appeals acknowledged when it noted that “a rape victim’s role in a 
                                                          
 52.  Id. 
 53.  See, e.g., Ronen Perry, Empowerment and Tort Law, 76 TENN. L. REV. 959, 975–78 
(2009).   
 54.  JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. 
LAW: TORTS 6 (2010). 
 55.  Swan, supra note 24, at 426. 
 56.  Jeremy Waldron, How Law Protects Dignity 2 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 11-83, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1973341. 
 57.  Id. at 3. 
 58.  Swan, supra note 24, at 416–17. 
 59.  Id. at 416 (quoting Kenneth W. Simons, The Crime/Tort Distinction: Legal Doctrine and 
Normative Perspectives, 17 WIDENER L. J. 719, 719 (2007)). 
 60.  Id. 
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criminal prosecution cannot accurately be described as ‘voluntary.’”
61
 
The denial of subjectivity inherent in a forced legal process is 
particularly problematic in the context of sexual assault.  It exacerbates part 
of the harm of sexual assault itself.  Rape and sexual assault are a denial of a 
victim’s autonomy and subjectivity; they are “a form of objectification” and 
“an implicit claim of superiority by the more powerful actor.”
62
  They 
involve a “more powerful party [. . .] impos[ing] his or her will on the other, 
regardless of the other’s desires and interests.”
63
 A forced legal process 
mimics this objectification. 
In addition to emphasizing the importance of a complainant-driven legal 
process in the sexual assault context, tort law, as an additional alternative 
framing for campus sexual assault, suggests that we interrogate the nature of 
these different frames, and examine what particular political ends they 
accomplish. Campus sexual assault is not inherently more of a crime than a 
civil rights violation, or inherently more of a crime than a tort.  Rather, it is 
all of these things simultaneously; each simply targets a different aspect (a 
harm to society, to a group, or to an individual), involves a different process 
(that of the criminal law, university disciplinary hearings, or civil court), and 
achieves a different remedy (punishment, a combination of accommodation 
and punishment, or compensation).  And by exposing the possibility of 
multiple characterizations, tort reminds us that the dogged insistence that 
campus sexual assault is a crime or a quintessential public wrong has a 
political consequence.  Through labeling it as a specifically criminal wrong, 
the criminal characterization “serves as a form of political rhetoric, one 
whose ‘social function . . . is to repress aspirations for alternative political 
arrangements by predisposing us to regard comprehensive alternatives to the 
established order as absurd.’”
64
  Insisting that all campus sexual assault must 
be funneled through the criminal law denies the possibilities that other 
approaches (like Title IX, and like tort) might create. 
This form of political rhetoric functions to maintain the status quo.  
Heretofore, the “net result of emphasizing rape as a ‘public’ wrong that 
should be addressed within the criminal law system has been that most rapes 
go unreported, uninvestigated, and unredressed.”
65
  The proposed legislation 
                                                          
 61.  Id. (quoting Street v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1234 (6th Cir. 1981)). 
 62.  Id. at 425–26. 
 63.  Id. at 425 (quoting Ronen Perry, Empowerment and Tort Law, 76 TENN. L. REV. 959, 961 
(2009)). 
 64.  Id. at 431 (quoting Karl Klare, The Public-Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1358, 1361 (1982)). 
 65.  Id. 
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would continue to perpetuate this state of affairs.  The legislation would 
likely deter students from reporting at all, as they would understand that a 
report would engage the criminal process even if they did not want that 
result.
66
  Rapes that were reported would likely continue to go 
uninvestigated, since the legislation would do nothing to remedy the chronic 
lack of follow-up and investigation for sexual assault complaints that has 
been shown to plague many police departments.
67
  The ultimate effect of 
such legislation, then, would be to allow sexual assault adjudication to 
continue to fail those who experience this harm. 
B.  Procedural Protections 
Criminal law advocates argue, as a second best option, that if 
universities insist on adjudicating campus sexual assault, such adjudications 
should employ many criminal procedural protections.  Whereas Title IX 
advocates argue that the adjudicative process should reflect “procedural 
equality,” and advance the goals of civil rights generally, criminal law 
advocates argue that more criminal due process protections should be 
offered.
68
  According to this argument, such significant due process is 
warranted because those accused of campus sexual assault face the 
possibility of expulsion, which is a severe consequence that “can follow 
students their entire lives.”
69
 
1. The Significance of Stigma and Expulsion 
Expulsion, however, is much more like the consequences of a civil law 
judgment than a criminal one.  The reputational and monetary consequences 
of a decision in favor of a plaintiff in a tort action involving sexual assault 
and a decision in favor of a complainant in a campus sexual assault 
                                                          
 66.  Cantalupo, supra note 6, at 293. 
 67.  See Swan, supra note 24, at 421 (describing how police departments have systemically 
mishandled rape cases). 
 68.  Cantalupo, supra note 6, at 294. 
 69.  Janel Davis & Shannon McCaffrey, Wrongly Accused of Rape? Students Question Their 
Expulsions from Tech, MYAJC.COM (Jan. 16, 2016), 
http://www.myajc.com/news/news/local/wrongly-accused-of-rape-students-question-their-ex/np59z/ 
(quoting Republican Rep. Earl Ehrhart); see also Dwight B. Shepard, Former Amherst College 
Student, Accused of Rape, Sues School Over Expulsion, MASSLIVE.COM (May 30, 2015, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2015/05/former_amherst_college_student.html.  There is 
also an argument that if this is so, that should have a positive deterrent effect.  See Jake New, 
Requiring a Red Flag, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 10, 2015), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/07/10/states-requiring-colleges-note-sexual-assault-
responsibility-student-transcripts. 
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proceeding are alike.  Regarding the reputational impact, finding a defendant 
liable for sexual assault and a respondent “responsible” for sexual assault 
have similar repercussions.  Stigma and a “mark of Cain” often accompany 
being known as someone who has committed a sexual assault in either 
context.
70
  However, neither a civil judgment nor a finding of responsibility 
are necessarily likely to travel far on their own: findings of liability in either 
context may not be widely broadcast or easily ascertainable.  For campus 
proceedings, only two states (New York and Virginia) currently require 
colleges to note findings of responsibility for a code of conduct violation on 
transcripts, and in total, slightly more than 10% of schools currently engage 
in such notations.
71
  Thus, in both the university and the civil context, while 
some stigma may attach when others know of the findings of liability and 
responsibility, often the information will not be widespread.  Many findings 
of responsibility will go unnoticed, unless someone is specifically told, or 
unless the adjudicatory decision is easily accessed on the Internet.  And 
many schools that are informed that students have perpetrated sexual assault 




Economically, a student may have difficulty obtaining employment if an 
employer requires a copy of a transcript and the finding of responsibility is 
noted there, or if the student’s case received media attention.
73
  A defendant 
found civilly liable for sexual assault would be in a similar situation: if his 
case had received media attention, that person may also have difficulty 
finding employment.  (Additionally, if a defendant was already employed, 
an action for wage garnishing could alert the employer to the wrongdoing as 
                                                          
 70.  Tamara Rice Lave, Affirmative Consent and Switching the Burden of Proof, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (Sept. 3, 2015), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/09/affirmative-
consent-and-switching-the-burden-of-proof.html (where blog commenters share personal knowledge 
of students who suffered reputational repercussions after being found responsible for campus sexual 
assault);  see also Colb, supra note 11. 
 71.   See Tyler Kingkade, Students Punished For Sexual Assault Should Have Transcripts 
Marked, Title IX Group Says, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 24, 2015, 4:17 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/sexual-assault-transcripts-
atixa_us_560420d0e4b0fde8b0d18d42; Jake New, Requiring a Red Flag, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 
10, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/07/10/states-requiring-colleges-note-sexual-
assault-responsibility-student-transcripts.  But, a commenter on Professor Tamara Lave’s blog article 
reveals that increased broadcasting of sexual assault liability may be on the horizon. She explains 
that “there are bills proposed in several states to make reporting to transfer schools mandatory and 
also to permanently mark the student’s transcript.  Also, FERPA allows schools to inform other 
schools of a sexual assault finding, and in the current climate, most schools ask.”  Lave, supra note 
68.  See also New, supra note 67.  
 72.  New, supra note 67.  
 73.  Lave, supra note 68 (commenter Cynthia Garrett relaying the difficulties some of her 
acquaintances have had after being found liable for campus sexual assault).  
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well.)  A large civil judgment and expulsion are also similar in that both are 
economic effects: it is difficult to earn high wages without a college degree, 
and it is difficult to amass wealth when one’s assets and income must be 
used to pay down a civil judgment.  In both cases, one can expect a lowered 
net worth and resultant economic hardship. 
2. Cross-Examination and the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard 
Given the similarities between a finding of civil liability and a finding of 
campus misconduct, similar procedural protections should apply to both 
processes.
74
  The opportunity for discovery should be present, as well as the 
opportunity to present a defense.
75
  Legal representation should be 
possible.
76
  Further, as the criminal law advocates suggest, campus sexual 
assault adjudications should include a right to cross-examine (albeit in a 
slightly modified form).  And, as the Title IX advocates suggest, the 
preponderance of the evidence standard should be used. 
Regarding cross-examination, “almost all” universities currently deny 
accused students the right to personally cross-examine the complainant.
77
  
Indeed, the United States Department of Education Office of Civil Rights 
(OCR), in its 2011 Dear Colleague Letter, set out its position regarding 
cross-examination in campus sexual assault proceedings: “OCR strongly 
discourages schools from allowing the parties personally to question or 
cross-examine each other during the hearing.  Allowing an alleged 
perpetrator to question an alleged victim directly may be traumatic or 
intimidating, thereby possibly escalating or perpetuating a hostile 
                                                          
 74.  At least to the extent that they can: Title IX does not give universities some of the powers 
of civil courts, like the power to subpoena.  KC Johnson, College Attorneys Face the War on Due 
Process, MINDING THE CAMPUS (June 27, 2014), 
http://www.mindingthecampus.org/2014/06/college-attorneys-face-the-war-on-due-process/.   
 75.  The Office of Civil Rights (OCR) also suggests that these procedural protections should be 
in place.  It recommends that campus sexual assault adjudication should involve the “adequate, 
reliable, and impartial investigations of complaints, including the opportunity to present relative 
witnesses and other evidence” and “timely access to any information that will be used at the 
hearing.”  Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. to Title IX 
coordinators 11 (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-
201104.pdf. 
 76.  Ideally, legal representation would not only be possible, but guaranteed.  Harvard Law 
School, for example, will provide funds for accused students to hire attorneys if they cannot 
personally afford one.  HLS Sexual Harassment Resources and Procedures for Students, HARVARD 
LAW SCHOOL (Dec. 18, 2014), 
http://hls.harvard.edu/content/uploads/2015/07/HLSTitleIXProcedures150629.pdf. 
 77.  Lave, supra note 68 (Professor Tamara Lave responding to blog commenters who share her 
concern that disciplinary proceedings on campus leave the accused with little chance to avoid 
liability, even if innocent). 





However, while the parties may not be permitted to directly ask 
questions themselves, most schools allow for the parties to cross-examine 
through another person, either a hearing officer or an advocate.
79
  This 
position strikes an appropriate balance of procedural protections, giving the 
respondent the benefits of cross-examination while at the same time 
ensuring the complainant is not unduly malevolently interrogated.
80
  It is 
important, though, as the California Superior Court recently affirmed in Doe 
v. Regents of the University of California San Diego, that the third-party 
tasked with asking questions actually do so.
81
  In Doe, “only nine of 
Petitioner’s thirty-two questions were actually asked by the Panel Chair.”
82
  
This anemic approach “curtailed” the accused’s right to confrontation, which 
is “crucial to any definition of a fair hearing.”
83
 
The close parallel between civil courts and Title IX in terms of 
consequences for the defendant also suggests that preponderance of the 
evidence is a defensible standard.  Some have argued that because sexual 
assault is a serious accusation, a standard of “clear and convincing” evidence 
should be used.
84
  But since no more stigma would come from a holding of 
“responsible” for sexual misconduct than would come from a holding of 
“liable” for sexual assault, and the consequence of expulsion is 
approximately as serious as being obligated to satisfy a large damages 
award, a preponderance of the evidence standard seems appropriate. 
Indeed, although it is often ignored in the Title IX versus criminal law 
                                                          
 78.  Letter from Russlyn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Title IX 
Coordinators (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf. 
 79.  Lave, supra note 68.  (Professor Tamara Lave responding to blog commenters).  
 80.  The Constitution requires very few protections for campus disciplinary proceedings.  “The 
Supreme Court has found that, before a public university can impose serious permanent sanctions, 
the Fifth Amendment requires only that it provide notice that an offense has been alleged and that it 
is holding a hearing about the matter.  At private institutions, the Constitution requires no procedural 
protections.  That’s not nearly enough.”  Brodsky, supra note 2; see also Wagner v. Fort Wayne 
Cmty. Schs., 255 F. Supp. 2d 915, 925 (N.D. Ind. 2003); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975); 
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333–34 (1976).  Cf. Donohue v. Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136, 145–
46 (N.D.N.Y 1997).  “The good news is that the U.S. Department of Education has recognized 
constitutional protections for accused students are too thin for fair and effective disciplinary systems.  
Through guidance to universities on how to investigate reports of sexual violence, the department’s 
Office for Civil Rights (OCR) has not only protected survivors but also created the country’s most 
robust regime of procedural rights for their alleged assailants.  A student accused of rape, then, is 
provided far more protections than his classmate accused of plagiarism.”  Brodsky, supra note 2. 
 81.  No. 37-2015-00010549-CU-WM-CTL, 2015 WL 4394597, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 10, 
2015).  
 82.  Id. at *2. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Cantalupo, supra note 6, at 290. 
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debate, civil courts have offered thoughtful decisions explicitly addressing 
whether non-criminal sexual assault claims should command a 
preponderance of the evidence or some higher standard.  The Canadian 
Supreme Court, for instance, held in F.H. v. McDougall that all civil cases, 
including those which involve conduct that may also be criminal (like sexual 
assault), are to be decided on the same standard: preponderance of the 
evidence.
85
  Prior to this decision, some courts reasoned that because sexual 
assault involves “higher moral blameworthiness” and a great deal of stigma, 
such claims should be subjected to heightened scrutiny in the civil courts.
86
  
After carefully weighing the potential sanctions and the significance of the 
stigma, the Court found that the preponderance of the evidence standard was 
the correct one.  Since the civil court consequences and the university 
consequences are so similar, the same evidentiary standard should arguably 
stand in both forums.
87
 
3. Tort Cases Challenging Poor Procedure 
Tort law also assists the debate over the appropriate procedural 
protection in campus sexual assault adjudications in another way: lawsuits 
alleging poor procedural processes on the part of schools often use tort law 
as a way of calibrating the appropriate scope of procedural protections.  
These lawsuits use negligence concepts to sort out the protections that are 
owed to both victims and perpetrators.
88
  Although perpetrator suits tend to 
attract more media attention, victims actually bring lawsuits more frequently, 
                                                          
 85.  F.H. v. McDougall, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 41. (Can.).  Indeed, the preponderance of the evidence 
standard is used in “sexual harassment and violence law suits under civil rights and tort law; federal 
agency processing of Title VII claims of harassment and violence in the workplace; prison decision-
making under the Prison Rape Elimination Act; and, as required by the Department of Education, 
university disciplinary investigations.”  Brodsky, supra note 2. 
 86.  Cheryl Pearson, The Advantages and Disadvantages of Civil Sexual Abuse Claims, 
THOMPSON DORFMAN SWEATMAN LLP BLOG (Jan. 27, 2014, 2:28 PM), 
http://www.tdslaw.com/knowledge-center/civil-claims-for-sexual-abuse/. 
 87.  Gertner suggests that the test of an appropriate evidentiary standard may depend on what 
other procedural protections are in place.  See Gertner, supra note 2.  The OCR’s position has 
become slightly murkier since the newly enacted Violence Against Women Act does not reference a 
specific standard, but rather simply indicates that schools must explicitly state in their sexual 
misconduct policies what evidentiary standard they will use.  HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP, AMERICAN 
COUNCIL ON EDUCATION, New Requirements Imposed by the Violence Against Women 
Reauthorization Act 2 (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.acenet.edu/news-room/Documents/VAWA-
Summary.pdf.  For sexual assault tort cases applying the preponderance standard, see T.P. v. Weiss, 
990 N.E. 2d 1098 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013) (“T.P. proved by the preponderance of the evidence that on 
July 29, 2008, Weiss committed a sexual assault and battery on T.P.”).  
 88.  United Educators Insurance, supra note 44, at 17–18.  
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and those suits end up being more expensive than perpetrator suits.
89
  For 
example, one insurer estimated it spent $17 million over two years 
“defending and resolving sexual assault claims,” and 84 percent of that $17 




 Negligence allegations figure prominently in these cases.
91
  “Nearly 
half (40 percent) of victims” alleged that the institution negligently 
investigated their claim, or negligently trained employees handling sexual 
assault claims.
92
  Negligence allegations were even more common in 
perpetrator lawsuits: 79% alleged negligence related to the university’s 
adjudicative process.
93
  As with the aforementioned example of Doe v. 
Regents of the University of California San Diego in the cross-examination 
context, these suits use tort to establish appropriate investigatory and 
adjudicative procedures.  Successful suits encourage schools to adopt 
procedures that are fair to all parties. 
C. Affirmative Consent 
The final issue that tort law helps to resolve is that of affirmative 
consent.  Consent has been a volatile flashpoint in the Title IX versus 
criminal law debate, even more so since jurisdictions like California and 
New York have adopted legislation imposing affirmative consent standards 
for colleges and universities.
94




                                                          
 89.  Id. at 14. 
 90.  Id.  See also Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Violating Student Victims’ Rights is Expensive, TIME 
(May 15, 2014), http://time.com/99697/campus-sexual-assault-nancy-chi-cantalupo/.  
 91.  Other common causes of action include breach of contract, Title IX, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.  UNITED EDUCATORS INSURANCE, supra note 44, at 17–18.  
 92.  Id. at 16. 
 93.  Id. at 18. 
 94.  Jaclyn Friedman, Adults Hate ‘Yes Means Yes’ Laws.  The College Students I Meet Love 
Them, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 14, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/10/14/adults-hate-affirmative-consent-
laws-the-college-students-i-meet-love-them/. 
 95.  Corey Rayburn Yung argues that affirmative consent standards will not significantly 
change case outcomes, since the legal standard for consent seems to have little actual bearing on 
what jurors do; cases normally turn on credibility, not legal standards; and “drunken sex cases,” 
which form a significant portion of campus sexual assault cases, are typically decided on incapacity 
grounds, not on affirmative consent.  Corey Rayburn Yung, California’s College Rape Rule is 
Probably a Bad Idea (but not for the reasons the critics say), CONCURRING OPINIONS (Oct. 7, 2014), 
http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2014/10/californias-college-rape-rule-is-probably-a-bad-
idea-but-not-for-the-reasons-the-critics-say.html.  For an example of a controversial case that turned 
on incapacitation, not consent, see Peter Jacobs, How ‘Consensual’ Sex Got a Freshman Kicked Out 
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Affirmative consent is a drastic departure from the criminal concept of 
consent to sexual activity.  Thus far, the criminal law has arguably operated 
on a standard that is the exact opposite of affirmative consent: a standard of 
“affirmative nonconsent.”
96
  Under an affirmative non-consent standard, 
prosecutors can meet their burden of proving that there was no consent only 
by showing that the victim affirmatively communicated the fact of non-
consent to her assailant.
97
  In other words, to secure a conviction, a 
prosecutor “must prove actual refusal,” through specific words like “no” or 
through physical resistance.
98
  Mere silence, or a void regarding consent, 
will not usually be the basis of a  criminal conviction; the criminal law will 
normally understand such silence or passivity to constitute consent.
99
 
The affirmative non-consent standard is based on “a legal presumption 
of female consent to sexual activity.”
100
  Affirmative consent, on the other 
hand, relies on a different default position: a presumption of non-consent.  
When affirmative non-consent is contrasted with the affirmative consent 
standard currently being promoted at colleges and universities, affirmative 
consent appears as such a drastic departure that critics argue it should not be 
entertained.  But a different story appears when affirmative consent is 
considered in the context of the civil law.  In civil law, the same 
presumption of non-consent that animates affirmative consent also animates 
much of tort law.  Both operate on the principle that people have the right to 
be left alone.  The presumption is particularly salient in the tort law of 
battery, an action premised on the right to be free from physical intrusions.  
Sexual assault claims are typically brought as battery actions.
101
 
                                                          
of College and Started a Huge Debate, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 15, 2014, 1:45 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/occidental-sexual-assault-2014-9.  
 96.  Lani Anne Remick, Comment, Read Her Lips: An Argument for a Verbal Consent 
Standard in Rape, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1103, 1110 (1993). 
 97.  Id.  
 98.  Dana Berliner, Note, Rethinking the Reasonable Belief Defense to Rape, 100 YALE L.J. 
2687, 2689 (1991) (emphasis added). 
 99.  Id.  
 100.  Remick, supra note 94.  This presumption need not be inherently offensive; “it can be 
viewed as merely effectuating the constitutional guarantee of a presumption of innocence and 
reflecting the fact that the majority of sexual interaction is consensual.”  Id.; see also Lawrence 
White, University Counsel, Georgetown University, The Legal Parameters of Consent in Cases of 
Alleged Sexual Battery or ‘Acquaintance Assault’ and the Analytically Related Issue of Institutional 
Policies on Consensual Sexual Relationships, Presentation at the 16th Annual Law & Higher 
Education Conference (Feb. 12–14, 1995),  
http://www.stetson.edu/law/conferences/highered/archive/1995/The_Legal_Parameters_of_Consent.
pdf. 
 101.  Bublick, supra note 34, at 71.  In addition to battery, common causes of action for sexual 
assault include intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, outrage, false imprisonment, and 
invasion of privacy.  Id.  
2016] BETWEEN TITLE IX AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 981 
 
Battery honors “the individual’s unfettered choice to determine who 
touches his [or her] body” and “how her body will be treated by others.”
102
  
Battery actions recognize that people are entitled to move about the world 
free from unwanted physical contact, and that the recognition of this right is 
fundamental to “core American values” of freedom, autonomy, and personal 
dignity.
103
  Battery advances “a person’s legal right not to suffer unwanted, 
intentional, and harmful or offensive physical contacts with his or her 
body.”
104
  These rights are especially important in the context of sexual 
contact, since “[t]he right to make decisions about sexual partners is central 
to” personal autonomy, self-actualization, and freedom.
105
 
In fact, the presumption of non-consent to physical intrusions has led 
some courts to find that a lack of consent is not even part of a plaintiff’s 
battery case; instead, consent is an affirmative defense which the defendant 
must raise and prove.
106
  This is the current law in a handful of states, and is 
echoed abroad in countries like Canada and Australia as well.
107
  The draft 
Restatement (Third) of Torts, though, takes the position that the plaintiff in a 
battery case does indeed have the “burden of persuasion” to “demonstrate 
that he or she did not actually consent to the contact.”
108
  However, even 
with the burden still on the party advancing the claim,. establishing a lack of 
consent in the civil context is subject to a lower bar than in the criminal 
courts.  The de facto affirmative non-consent standard seen in the criminal 
law is not present in the tort law context.  Instead, there is a more balanced 
consent standard.  The plaintiff must establish that he or she did not consent, 
but not to the same affirmative non-consent standard as the criminal law. 
                                                          
 102.  Deana Pollard-Sacks, Intentional Sex Torts, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1051, 1073, 1077 n.125 
(2008) (citing DAN DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 54 (2000)). 
 103.  Id. at 1073. 
 104.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 101 cmt. b 
(Discussion Draft, Apr. 3, 2014). 
 105.  Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, Protecting the Dignity and Autonomy of Women: Rethinking the 
Place of Constructive Consent in the Tort of Sexual Battery, 39 U.B.C. L. REV. 3, 20 (2006). 
 106.  See Nancy J. Moore, Intent and Consent in the Tort of Battery: Confusion and Controversy, 
61 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1592 (2012). 
 107.  Id. at 1636.  In Australia, consent is an affirmative defense to battery that the defendant, not 
the plaintiff, must prove.  In the seminal case on this issue, the judge held that to “find otherwise 
would be to fail to adequately recognise individual autonomy and the right to have control over 
one’s body.”  Tom Tian & Richard Sawyer, Comment, Negligent Sexual Assault: Reform of the 
Criminal Law and a Tort Alternative, 4 PUB. SPACE: J.L. & SOC. JUST. 105, 116 (2009). 
 108.  RESTATEMENT, supra note 104 at § 101 cmt. i (Discussion Draft, Apr. 3, 2014).  According 
to the Restatement, the following elements comprise battery: (1) “the actor intends to cause a contact 
with the person of the other;” (2) “the actor’s conduct causes such a contact;” (3) “the contact (i) is 
offensive or (ii) causes bodily harm to the other;” and (4) “the other does not actually consent to the 
contact [or to the conduct that causes the contact].”  Id. at § 101.  
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In order to make sense of how the differing available consent standards 
operate in the campus sexual assault context, consider the following 
scenario: 
Justin and Olivia are freshman. They attend the same history class, but 
know each other only in passing.  Approximately one month into their 
first semester, they encounter each other at a party.  Both are fairly 
intoxicated, but able to walk, talk, and generally function.  They flirt 
and dance together for the rest of the evening.  After party-hopping 
together into the wee hours of the morning, Justin invites Olivia to 
come to his apartment.  She agrees.  Once there, they begin kissing.  
Justin unzips Olivia’s dress, and she agrees to its removal.  They both 
get into his top bunk bed.  Olivia is enjoying the kissing but is also 
quite tired.  Justin asks Olivia if it is okay for their intimacies to 
advance.  Olivia replies only that she is “not sure” they “know each 
other well enough.”  According to Justin’s account, they then “discuss[] 
the matter briefly,” and he “interprets[]” her remark to mean that she is 
concerned about his previous sexual history.  He therefore offers to use 
a condom.  She replies that he need not get up, and resumes kissing 
him.  According to Olivia, she told him that she was unsure they knew 
each other well enough, and that she was not going to have sex with 
him because she had not had sex before and did not want to do it “on a 
whim.”  He kept stating that he had a condom somewhere else in the 
room.  The two both agree that they subsequently had sexual relations.  
Justin claims it was with Olivia’s “active assistance.”  Olivia claims 
that it was not, and that she made some limited attempt to push him off, 
but that she did not push vigorously as she was worried about falling 
out of the high bunk bed.
109
 
According to the affirmative non-consent standard of the criminal law, 
Justin would almost certainly not be convicted.  The prosecution would be 
unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no consent.  
However, according to the preponderance of the evidence standard of 
consent in the civil law, Justin could potentially be liable.  The trier of fact 
could find that on these facts, it is more likely than not that there was no 
consent.  Most university proceedings under Title IX that are not employing 
an affirmative consent standard would approach the issue in this way as 
well.  Justin is similar to defendants who make a “sincere but unreasonable” 
mistake about consent.
110
  In such instances, the plaintiff prevails.
111
 
Finally, on an affirmative consent standard, Justin would likely be found 
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 111.  Id. 
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responsible for sexual misconduct.
112
  The key to affirmative consent is 
“only yes means yes;” ambiguous words and acts are not sufficient proof of 
consent.  The affirmative consent standard removes the possibility of 
apparent consent from the legal equation.  Instead of allowing ambiguity to 
signal consent, affirmative consent requires “explicit, unambiguous consent 
in fact.”
113
  Once the plaintiff has produced evidence of a lack of consent, to 
escape liability the defendant must show that there was an affirmative yes to 
the impugned activity.
114
  Here, there was no affirmative yes present, so 
Justin would likely be found responsible.  Indeed, the trier of fact in the 
scenario upon which this example is based held Justin to an affirmative 
consent standard and found, in a written decision addressed to him, that: 
An objective person in your situation would have been confused by the 
incongruence between the words which [Olivia] spoke and the 
messages her body was sending.  Given that state of confusion, it was 
incumbent upon you to stop and talk about what [Olivia] actually 
wanted.  Knowing of her hesitation, the burden was on you to get an 
explicit yes.  You failed to do so and therefore engaged in intentional, 




You were persistent and overly aggressive in your attempts to verbally 
convince [Olivia] to have sex with you.  You made assumptions about 
what [Olivia] wanted based on what you viewed as “shows of 
affection” on her part.  I find that you misread these cues and engaged 
in sexual behavior to which [Olivia] had not given an explicit “yes.”
116
 
Viewed with the criminal standard as the reference point, the leap to the 
affirmative consent standard used in the above decision seems extreme.  
However, if instead, affirmative consent is measured against the civil 
standard, it appears as only a slight departure, and becomes a 
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“comprehensible extension of consent theory in tort law.”
117
  “Non-
consensual sexual contact constitutes a serious violation of personal 
autonomy” and “the inherent and enduring nature of harm from sexual abuse 
supports the view that those who decide to engage in sexual activities with 
others without seeking their affirmative consent do so at their own risk.”
118
  
The affirmative consent standard exemplifies this.
119
 
Indeed, a standard similar to affirmative consent is already present in 
tort law battery cases, in the context of medical negligence.
120
  Specifically, 
the kind of consent required for these claims is of a kind with affirmative 
consent standards.  Consider Stephen J. Schulhofer’s parable of surgery: 
A hospitalized athlete, suffering from chronic knee problems, consults 
a surgeon, who recommends an operation.  The athlete is not sure.  If 
the operation is successful, he will enjoy a long, fulfilling career with 
his team.  But there are imponderables.  The operation carries a risk of 
a burdensome infection that can be hard to cure.  The procedure may 
not produce the expected benefits.  In any event, it is sure to be 
stressful in the short run.  The athlete hesitates.  There are clear 
advantages, clear disadvantages, and lots of uncertainties.  What to do?  
Maybe he should postpone this big step for a while, see how things go 
without it.  The surgeon is encouraging: ‘Try it.  You’ll like it.’  Still 
the athlete is unsure. 
Now our surgeon becomes impatient.  He has spent a lot of time with 
this case.  The athlete’s hesitation is becoming tiresome and annoying.  
So the surgeon signals an anesthesiologist to ready the drugs that will 
flow through an intravenous tube already in place.  One last time the 
surgeon (a sensitive, modern male) reminds the athlete, ‘You don’t 
have to go ahead with this.  If you really want me to stop, just say so.’  
But the athlete, his brain clouded with doubts, fears, hopes, and 




In this surgery scenario, we would all agree that there was no consent.  
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An argument to the contrary, that there was consent because “[t]he athlete 
was not compelled to submit.  Nobody forced him . . . [s]urely his silence 
proves that he was not unwilling.  If he really objected, all he had to do was 
say so!” is entirely unpersuasive in this example.
122
  This is because we 
intuitively see the surgeon’s actions (in proceeding even though the patient 
never made as a conscious choice) as violating the athlete’s autonomy.
123
  In 
the surgical context, we firmly believe that affirmative resistance or non-
consent is an inappropriate standard; nor can mere silence suffice.
124
  In the 
surgical context, consent cannot mean anything less than “unambiguous, 




Arguably, “the same conceptions of autonomy and non-consent” are 
equally applicable to sexual acts.
126
  The mental state of the patient in the 
surgery scenario and that described by many women in the sexual assault 
context are similar.  Author Susan Dominus eloquently describes the 
experience of some women regarding consent in the sexual assault context: 
“in the moment, they froze, and language eluded them altogether: They said 
nothing.  Because [words like no] are inherently confrontational, they can 
require a degree of strength that someone who is feeling pressured or 
confused or is just losing her nerve or changing her mind might not have.”
127
  
Further, like medical battery, a sexual intrusion is also a significant harm, 
and for such intrusions, “actual permission” or a “crystallized attitude of 
positive willingness” should be required.
128
  While there are, of course, 
many respects in which surgery is not like sexual activity,
129
 the underlying 
interests in battery actions in both contexts are alike.  Both protect the 
integrity of the body from physical invasion, and both are premised on an 
individual’s inviolate right to determine who can make physical contact with 
his or her body, and the parameters of such contact. 
 IV. CONCLUSION 
The conversation surrounding campus sexual assault has devolved into 
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two polarized positions: one in which Title IX proceedings in the university 
context are the appropriate forum for adjudication of these claims, and one 
in which the only appropriate place of redress is the criminal court.  Both 
sides ignore the conceptualization of campus sexual assault as a tort, and 
thus miss the contributions this can add to the conversation.  The exclusion 
is understandable: it is a product of criminal law’s hegemony, and the slow 
historical development of a civil action for sexual assault.  But once the 
framing of campus sexual assault as a tort is brought into the campus sexual 
assault debate, it can assist in resolving three contentious issues.  First, it 
suggests that the move to mandate that all campus sexual assault complaints 
must go through law enforcement is misguided.  Second, it suggests that the 
appropriate procedural protections are the ones found in the civil courts.  
Third, tort law suggests that affirmative consent is a justifiable standard. 
Tort law tells us that it is possible to fairly adjudicate sexual assault 
outside of the criminal justice system, and thus bolsters the Title IX 
argument that it is possible for universities to “hold fair hearings and comply 
with Title IX.”
130
  Moreover, tort law can help plot the path to those fair 
hearings.  We all have a “stake in the integrity” of the campus sexual assault 
process: victims deserve to have their complaints efficiently and effectively 
addressed and their right to an equal education honored, accused students 
deserve to have a fair process that bears the hallmarks of procedural justice, 
and society as a whole deserves to have confidence that this disturbing social 
problem is being properly addressed.
131
  Bringing tort law to the campus 
sexual assault debate brings us one step closer to achieving these goals. 
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